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Comment

Perpetual Congressional Inaction: State
Regulation of Immigration in Response to
Lack of Reform

I.

INTRODUCTION

The debate over the issue of immigration has been raging for years
now, culminating in a nationwide demand for general immigration law
reform-with states attempting to take matters into their own hands by
passing immigration enforcement laws. For the most part, these forays
into immigration legislation by states have been struck down by the
United States Supreme Court.' However, as immigration reform looms
in the future of Congressional action, open questions still remain as to
what avenues states have left to participate in immigration regulation.
This Comment will attempt to answer those questions by analyzing the
development of immigration law and how the recent Supreme Court
decision in Arizona v. United States2 is currently being applied.
Specifically, this Comment will answer the question of what power, if
any, remains for the states to regulate immigrants within their own
borders. First, Part II looks at the history of cases regarding immigra1. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
2. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
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tion regulation, focusing on the preemption doctrine and its application
to immigration.3 Part III follows the creation of the plenary-power
doctrine by the Supreme Court and how Congress subsequently
developed immigration law.' Part IV begins by reviewing Arizona, then
analyzing how Arizona has since been applied in two recent cases from
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.' Part V
speculates what impact a recent decision concerning the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA) may have on immigration.' Part VI looks at
what avenues states still have to regulate immigrants without conflicting with federal law.' Finally, to show the importance of not only
passing reform, but passing the right kind of reform, Part VII looks at
the vast impact some of the harshest self-deportation legislation had on
Alabama.'
II.

FOUNDATION FOR CHALLENGES AGAINST STATE IMMIGRATIONRELATED LAws: FEDERAL PREEMPTION

Most recent challenges to state immigration-related laws have focused
on whether those laws were preempted by federal law."o Generally,
these challenges have been based on the idea that these state immigration-related laws cannot coexist with the federal immigration regulations
already in place. Therefore, an understanding of the general preemption doctrine is necessary to analyze the challenges against state
immigration-related laws.
The foundation for the doctrine of preemption is provided by the
Supremacy Clause, which states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound

3. See infra notes 10-54 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 55-99 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 100-194 and accompanying text.

6. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996).
7. See infra notes 195-204 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 205-241 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 242-258 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2497; Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v.
Governor of Ga., 691 F.3d 1250 (11thCir. 2012); United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269

(11thCir. 2012).
11. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2497; Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights, 691 F.3d at
1256-57; Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1279.
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thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.12
Therefore, "if a federal statute establishes a rule, and if the Constitution
grants Congress the power to establish that rule, then the rule preempts
whatever state law it contradicts."13 Consequently, courts necessarily
begin by establishing that Congress validly enacted the federal law in
question within the limitations of its enumerated powers."' Courts are
"guided by two cornerstones" when determining the extent to which state
law is preempted by federal law." First, "the purpose of Congress is
the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case."e Second, the
preemption analysis is guided by an "assumption that the historic police
powers of the States were not to be superseded . .. unless that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress." This has been labeled the
presumption against preemption and has led to a level of deference to
state and local laws within areas of traditional state concern."
However, when a state regulates in an area with "a history of significant
federal presence," the presumption against preemption is not applied.'9
Congress can demonstrate its intent to preempt state law "by express
language in a congressional enactment [express preemption], by
implication from the depth and breadth of a congressional scheme that
occupies the legislative field [field preemption], or by implication because
of a conflict with a congressional enactment [conflict preemption]."

A.

Express Preemption

Express preemption is found when a federal law includes a clause
explicitly removing specified powers from the states.2 ' Courts focus on
the plain language of preemption clauses when they are included, as it

12. U.S. CONST. art. VI, para. 1.
13. Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REv. 225, 264 (2000).
14. William Hochul III, Enforcement in Kind: Reexamining the PreemptionDoctrinein
Arizona v. United States, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 2225, 2227 (2012).
15. Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1281-82 (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009)).
16. Id. at 1282 (quoting Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 565).
17. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 565 (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).
18. Jennifer R. Phillips,Arizona'sS.B. 1070 and FederalPreemptionof State and Local
Immigration Laws: A Case for a More Cooperative and StreamlinedApproach to Judicial
Review of Subnational Immigration Laws, 85 S. CAL. L. REv. 955, 967 (2012) (discussing
areas of traditional state concern, "such as the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens.").
19. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000).
20. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001) (citations omitted).
21. See, e.g., id. at 540-41 (describing a federal scheme expressly prohibiting states from
regulating tobacco advertising).
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"necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress' preemptive
intent."22 For example, the Immigration Reform and Control Act
(IRCA) of 198623 has an express preemption clause that prohibits "any
State or local law [from] imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than
through licensing and similar laws)" on employers who hire undocumented immigrants."

B. Field Preemption
Field preemption is found where "the federal interest is so dominant"
in a federal regulatory scheme that it may be presumed that Congress
intended to occupy the entire area of law, leaving no room for state
action.' The Court has found that some federal regulatory schemes
are "so pervasive" that "Congress left no room for the States to
supplement it."26 Furthermore, the "federal interest" in a field can be
"so dominant" that federal law "will be assumed to preclude enforcement
of state laws on the same subject."2 ' A finding of field preemption
results in states being limited or excluded from the field."

C. Conflict Preemption
It is well settled that a state law that "actually conflicts" with a
federal statute is preempted, even if the statute contains no express
preemption clause or does not impliedly occupy a field.29 State law is
conflict preempted when it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,"30 as well
as when it is a "physical impossibility" to comply with both the federal
and state law.31 Conflict preemption has also been found when local

22. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1977 (2011) (quoting CSX
Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993)).
23. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2012).
24. Id. § 1324a(hX2).
25. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S.
190, 204 (1983) (quoting Fid. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153
(1982); see also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (holding that
congressional purpose to supersede historic state powers can be inferred from an area in
which there is a "dominant" federal interest in a federal regulatory scheme).
26. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
27. Id.
28. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000).
29. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).
30. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
31. Id. (quoting Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963)).
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immigration law "has had a deleterious effect on the United States'
Ultimately, "a statute is preempted ... if it
foreign relations."
conflicts with federal law making compliance with both state and federal
law impossible." 3
Development of Immigration Preemption
The exclusivity granted to the federal government by preemption over
immigration is not explicitly granted anywhere. Indeed, the Constitution makes no specific grant of power over immigration to the federal
government, the closest approximation being the Article I grant of power
to Congress to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization."' The
Supreme Court found its preemption power in early cases addressing
state regulation of immigration through the power to address foreign
commerce.3 5
In 1876, the Court struck down statutes passed by New York and
Louisiana that required the owners of vessels with foreign passengers on
board to post a bond of three hundred dollars for each passenger before
the ship could land in order to indemnify the state, should the passengers become public charges. 6 While not explicitly excluding immigrants, the statutes substantially burdened immigration by taxing the
37
process. The Court held that such a burdening of immigration was a
regulation of commerce, a power exclusively vested in the federal
government.3 8
Similar to Arizona's recent assertions, New York and Louisiana
claimed they were not regulating immigration, but were rather

D.

32. United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 352 (9th Cir. 2011), affd in part and rev'd
in part 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
33. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 701 F. Supp. 2d 835, 853
(N.D. Tex. 2010) (quoting Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 577 F.
Supp. 2d 858, 867 (N.D. Tex. 2008)).
34. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, para. 4.
35. Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275,280 (1876); Henderson v. Mayor of N.Y., 92 U.S.
259, 270 (1876).
36. Henderson, 92 U.S. at 267, 275.
37. Id. at 268 (stating that "if it is apparent that the object of this statute . . . is to
compel the owners of vessels to pay a sum of money for every passenger brought by them
from a foreign shore, and landed at the port of New York, it is as much a tax on passengers
if collected from them, or a tax on the vessel or owners for the exercise of the right of
landing their passengers in that city").
38. Id. at 271-72 (stating that "a rule emanating from any lawful authority, which
prescribes terms or conditions on which alone the vessel can discharge its passengers, is
a regulation of commerce; and, in case of vessels and passengers coming from foreign ports,
is a regulation of commerce with foreign nations").
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exercising their state police powers." At the time, those powers were
broader than today, encompassing "the protection of the [lives], health,
and property of the citizens, and . .. the preservation of good order and
the public morals."" However, the Court dismissed this justification,
stating that "[niothing is gained in the argument by calling it the police
power."4 1
Another case decided the same day, Chy Lung v. Freeman," further
expanded on the federal government's exclusive control over immigration. In Chy Lung, a Chinese woman was detained under a California
statute requiring ships' masters to post bond for any passenger deemed
a "lewd or debauched woman," "a convicted criminal," "lunatic, idiotic,
deaf, dumb, blind, crippled, or infirm," or "likely to become a public
charge." The Court struck the California statute down, as it did the
New York and Louisiana statutes, holding that it amounted to an
impermissible encroachment upon the federal commerce power." The
Court examined the impact on foreign relations with regard to the
admission of immigrants, reasoning that such matters were exclusively
federal." While Congress itself had passed a law very similar to
California's, the Court was afraid that any one state's policy could be
mistaken as a sentiment of the nation as a whole.4 6 If that were to
happen, the government of the United States would be held responsible-not the state of California. Therefore, these cases suggested that
immigration regulation is a power exclusive to the federal government,
rooted in the Commerce Clause,"' because it has the potential to impact
foreign affairs. The notion of immigration as exclusively a federal power
that implicates unique federal concerns, has been identified by Professor
Hiroshi Motomura as one of his two elements of "immigration exceptionalism."
The second element of immigration exceptionalism developed a few
years after the Henderson and Chy Lung cases, as the Court began to
alter the deference showed to constitutional challenges to federal
immigration statutes, developing the doctrine that became known as

39. Id. at 271.
40. Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 33 (1878).
41. Henderson, 92 U.S. at 271.
42. 92 U.S. 275 (1876).
43. Id. at 277.
44. Id. at 280-81.
45. Id. at 280.
46. See id.
47. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, para. 3.
48. Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, InternationalHuman Rights, and Immigration
Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1363-64 (1999).
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"plenary power."' Moreover, at least one scholar, Kerry Abrams, has
suggested that the two elementsare related in that the values, logic, and
rhetoric of the "plenary power" cases in the second elementhave been
adopted in some of the federalism cases in the first prong."o Abrams
characterizes these cases as essentially concerned with "plenary power
preemption."' Thus, whereas in the traditional "plenary power" cases
congressional statutes can displace individual rights guarantees under
the Bill of Rights," in these cases congressional statutes can displace
state legislation in the immigration area." Moreover, arguably the
Court has adopted a similar attitude of special deference to Congress as
well, reaching results that would not have been reached under standard
preemption analysis.'
III.

ESTABLISHMENT OF PLENARY POWER AND DEVELOPMENT OF
IMMIGRATION REGULATION

A.

The FederalGovernment's Plenary Power Over Immigration

The creation of the plenary-power doctrine took place when the
Supreme Court was called upon to determine the constitutionality of
several racially discriminatory laws that excluded Chinese immigrants
and made them targets for deportation. In 1864, the federal government
passed what is considered the first "comprehensive" immigration law,
creating an agency tasked with recruiting immigrants for the Civil
War." Following the repeal of the 1864 legislation, the federal government passed new legislation that prohibited certain immigrants, namely
those that were deemed idiots, lunatics, persons with certain criminal
convictions, and individuals likely to become public charges, from
gaining entrance to the United States.
Subsequently, the federal
government began passing racially restrictive immigration laws, such as
the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882,s' which suspended all future

49. Id.
50. Kerry Abrams, Plenary Power Preemption, 99 VA. L. REv. 601, 617 (2013).
51. Id. at 601.
52. U.S. CONST. amend. I-X
53. See id. at 639-40.
54. Id.
55. An Act to Encourage Immigration (1864 Immigration Act), ch. 246, 13 Stat. 385
(1864).
56. An Act to Regulate Immigration (1882 Immigration Act), ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214, § 2
(1882).
57. An Act to Execute Certain Treaty Stipulations Relating to Chinese (Chinese
Exclusion Act of 1882), ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882).
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immigration of Chinese laborers." This set the stage for the Supreme
Court to establish the government's plenary power with regard to
immigration law.
The Constitution has been interpreted by the Supreme Court as giving
the federal government plenary power with regard to immigration
regulation." Without an explicit grant of power over immigration to
the federal government in the Constitution, the Supreme Court began
establishing constitutional authority derived from implied powers. In
Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case),60 the
Supreme Court upheld Congressional legislation that prohibited Chinese
laborers from entering the United States.6 ' In holding in favor of
Congress and the United States Government, Justice Field stated:
The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty
belonging to the government of the United States, as a part of those
sovereign powers delegated by the Constitution, the right to its exercise
at any time when, in the judgment of the government, the interests of
the country require it, cannot be granted away or restrained on behalf
of any one.62
Thus, the Court acknowledged that, under the plenary-power doctrine,
the executive and legislative branches have superior authority over the
regulation of immigration.63
In Nishimura Ekiu v. United States,' the Supreme Court upheld an
officer's determination to exclude Nishimura Ekiu based on her
likelihood of becoming a public charge. The Court initially recognized
the federal government's power to regulate immigrants through the
Commerce Clause.
Accordingly, the Court reasoned that Congress
had determined the fact-finding decision of exclusion was the decision of
the officer at the port, not the Court. 67 Moreover, this presented no
violation of due process.6 8 Therefore, the Court further established
plenary power by holding that Congress has the authority to limit the

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
See infra notes 102-194 and accompanying text.
130 U.S. 581 (1889).
Id. at 609.
Id.
See id.
142 U.S. 651 (1892).
Id. at 663-64.
Id. at 659.
Id. at 660.
Id.
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judiciary's ability to review findings of fact made during exclusion
procedures by executive officials."
One year later in Fong Yue Ting v. United States,o the Supreme
Court upheld a similar statutory provision that required, as a condition
of receiving a certificate of residency, testimony from one white witness
as to whether the alien was a resident of the United States at the time
the act was passed." In so holding, Justice Gray stated that "[tihe
right of a nation to expel or deport foreigners . .. rests upon the same
grounds, and is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and
prevent their entrance into the country."72 In the years since, the
Court has followed the doctrine, remaining largely deferential to the
executive and legislative branches." This deference led to numerous
legislative acts targeting varying nationalities, races, and political
ideologies."
In sum, plenary power within the immigration context has been
understood to mean that courts will apply a very generous standard in
favor of the federal government when a federal immigration regulation
statute is at issue.
B.

The Development of the Federal Immigration Regulatory Scheme
Following the above cases, Congress began to promulgate more
immigration regulation, eventually resulting in the system we have
today. To begin, Congress established a national quota system,
introducing for the first time numerical restrictions on immigration,
albeit temporary ones, by passing the Immigration Act of 1921.7 To
establish a more stable quota, Congress passed the first permanent
policy of numerical limitations with the Immigration Act of 1924 (the
National Origins Act).76
69. Id.

70. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
71. Id. at 729.
72. Id. at 707.
73. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765-66 (1972) ("[The Court's general
reaffirmations of [the plenary power doctrine] have been legion. The Court without
exception has sustained [it] . . ."); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S.
206, 222-23 (1953) ("Due process does not invest any alien with a right to enter the United
States, nor confer on those admitted the right to remain against the national will. Nothing
in the Constitution requires admission or sufferance of aliens hostile to our scheme of
government."); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952).
74. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414,66 Stat. 163;
Internal Security Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-831, 64 Stat. 987; Alien Registration Act of
1940, Pub. L. No. 76-670, 54 Stat. 670 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (2012)).
75. Pub. L. No. 67-5, 42 Stat. 5.
76. Pub. L. No. 68-139, 43 Stat. 153.
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The next major legislative act concerning immigration came in 1952
when Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),"
which is still in use today and set out the general organizational
structure of federal immigration law." The INA has been amended
many times throughout the years, but initially it retained the previously
established numerical limitations, adopted a national origin system
determining how the quota was to be divided, created a preference
system granting family members and economically sound immigrants
priority over others, stated a separate list of deportable immigrants, and
created a system where individuals with family ties to a United States
citizen or permanent resident could receive relief from deportation."
In 1965, Congress enacted extensive legislative modifications, in large
part as a response to the Civil Rights Movement.o The modifications
eliminated the national origins quota system and instead put into place
a unified immigration quota for all immigration outside of the Western
Hemisphere.8 ' Notably, the amendment also ended the discriminatory
immigration limitations placed on "Orientals," and additionally
prohibited discrimination due to race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or
place of residence.82 Perhaps most significantly, the act made immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, defined as spouses and children of U.S.
citizens and parents of U.S. citizens who are at least twenty-one years
of age, exempt from the worldwide numerical limitations.83 This
concept of favoring immediate relatives has remained, as today the U.S.
immigration system still prioritizes family-based immigration over workbased immigration.'
While the 1965 INA opened several new doors through which an
immigrant may lawfully enter the country, it did not address the
growing alarm over aliens who were entering the country undocumented
and illegally. In response, Congress passed the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986 (IRCA)." The IRCA imposed new penalties upon

77. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537
(2012)).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified at
8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537).
81. Id. § 1.
82. Id. § 2.
83. Id. § 1.
84. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (providing for preferential treatment for family-sponsored
immigrants over employment-based immigrants in allocating immigrant visas).
85. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359.
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employers who employed undocumented immigrants." It also established the first amnesty and legalization program for undocumented
immigrants.'
Four years later, Congress passed the Immigration Act of 1990,8
which brought even more far-reaching changes to immigration law.
Notably, the 1990 Act raised the worldwide immigration quota from
290,000 to 700,000 for three years, and then decreased it to 675,000.9
The 1990 Act also codified "temporary protected status," a discretionary
remedy for certain categories of immigrants who are in danger but do
not qualify for asylum.o Finally, the 1990 Act made several other
changes aimed at reducing delays, overhauling the grounds for exclusion,
and strengthening the rules regarding deportation of non-citizens on
crime-related grounds.91
However, the concern for undocumented immigrants still remained
after the 1990 Act-indeed, if anything, the concern grew. In response,
Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)." While the IIRIRA was most
obviously aimed at further reducing the presence of illegal immigrants,
it also brought important changes to several other areas of immigration
law. As stated by immigration scholars Stephen H. Legomsky and
Cristina M. Rodriguez, "Congress expanded the substantive criteria for
removing noncitizens, further restricted discretionary relief, introduced
a number of 'expedited' procedures for noncitizens facing removal from
the United States, imposed additional restrictions on asylum seekers,
and sought to immunize a range of federal immigration determinations
from judicial review."
Thus, the IIRIRA brought far greater change
than simply speeding up the removal process.
Finally, the most noteworthy changes to occur since the IIRIRA came
in the form of security measures taken following the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001. In response to growing national security concerns,
Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act of 200194 and the Enhanced
Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (The Border Security

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. § 101, 100 Stat. 3360 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a).
Id. § 201, 100 Stat. 3394, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a (2012).
Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978.
Id. § 101.
Id. § 302.

91. Id.

92. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546.
93. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CHRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE
LAW AND POLIcY 22 (5th ed. 2009).

94. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
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Act).95 The USA PATRIOT Act expanded the definition of terrorism,
sanctioned the detention of non-citizens, and mandated increased
scrutiny during background checks and security clearances for visas. 96
The Border Security Act contained several other security measures in
addition to those put forth in the USA PATRIOT Act, such as implementing an improved tracking system for foreign students.97 Finally,
Congress passed the Homeland Security Act of 2002,8 which eliminated the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and vested control
in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) over immigration
issues."
IV.

RECENT IMMIGRATION-RELATED CASES CHALLENGED ON
PREEMPTION GROUNDS

Several recent cases have reaffirmed congressional preemption of state
legislation in the immigration area. As discussed earlier, arguably these
cases represent a "plenary power preemption" that reaches results that
may not have been reached under standard preemption analysis. 0 0

A. Arizona v. United States
1. Majority Opinion. The battle over Arizona's controversial
immigration law led to the Supreme Court's most influential opinion
regarding immigration in decades. In Arizona v. United States,'o' the
Court struck down three provisions of an Arizona law while permitting
one of the most highly contested sections-the "show-me-your-papers"
provision-to remain in effect.o 2 Overall, the decision represents an
enormous setback for proponents of the Arizona bill and similar state
laws, but still does not provide a solution for states whose citizens grow
increasingly more concerned about the illegal residents present within
their borders.

95. Pub. L. No. 107-173, 116 Stat. 543; see also Lawrence M. Lebowitz & Ira L.
Podheiser, A Summary of the Changes in Immigration Policies and Practices After the
TerroristAttacks of September 11, 2001: The USA PatriotAct and Other Measures, 63 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 873, 875-76, 885-86 (2002).
96. Lebowitz & Podheiser, supra note 95, at 875-85.
97. Id. at 885-86.
98. Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135.
99. Id. § 101.
100. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.

101.

132 S. Ct. 2492.

102.

Id. at 2510.
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In 2010, Arizona enacted the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe
Neighborhoods Act (S.B. 1070).103 The law contained ten substantive
sections, the purpose of which was provided in the first section:
The legislature declares that the intent of this act is to make attrition
through enforcement the public policy of all state and local government
agencies in Arizona. The provisions of this act are intended to work
together to discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of
aliens and economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the
United States'04
The key provisions of S.B. 1070 included the creation of new crimes
based on state immigration law, authorization of state law enforcement
officers to make specific immigration-based arrests, and requirement of
state officers to ask suspected unlawfully present residents to provide
immigration papers during a police stop.'os Immediately, the law was
criticized by many people nationwide as "the nation's toughest bill on
illegal immigration." 06
Following legal challenges by both private plaintiffs and the United
States in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona
resulting in four provisions of S.B. 1070 being enjoined,1o' a decision
which was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, 0 ' Arizona sought certiorari to the Supreme Court of the
United States.0 9 Because the district court never considered the
allegation that the law amounted to an impermissible and unconstitutional exercise of state power over immigration, the only issue before the
Court was the validity of the injunction against the four provisions of
S.B. 1070."0

Specifically, the provisions at issue before the Court were: section 3,
which made any violation of federal alien registration law also a state
crime;"' section 5(C), which made it a crime for an unlawfully present

103.

Ariz. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (2010) (codified in scattered sections of

ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN.).
104. Id. § 1.
105. See id. §§ 2-7.
106. Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration, N.Y. TIMEs
(Apr. 23, 2010), http-//www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/us/politics/24immig.html?_r-0.
107. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1008 (D. Ariz. 2010).
108. United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 366 (9th Cir. 2011).
109. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 845 (2011).
110. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2497-98.
111. Section 3 states in pertinent part that "a person is guilty of willful failure to
complete or carry an alien registration document if the person is in violation of [federal
alien registration law]." Aluz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1509 (LexisNexis 2012).
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alien to seek or perform work;.. section 6, which authorized police
officers in Arizona to arrest, without a warrant, individuals suspected of
having committed an offense that would allow them to be removed from
the country;"' and section 2(B), the "show-me-your-papers" provision,
which mandated that police officers detain and verify the immigration
status of any individual who has been otherwise stopped by the police,
provided that the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the individual
is an "unlawfully present" alien."'
With a five-justice majority, the Court invalidated three of the four
provisions." The Court struck down the penalties imposed by § 3 on
the ground that any state legislation was barred because the federal
registration scheme promulgated by Congress was comprehensive,
leaving no room for state action." Therefore, because Congress has
occupied the entire field, the Court rejected Arizona's argument that
state legislation that complements or supplements the federal scheme
should be permissible, even if the state legislation had the same goals
and substantive standards as its federal counterpart." 7
Next, the Court held that the criminal penalty imposed by § 5(C) on
any unlawfully present individual who sought or engaged in work
conflicted with the decision by Congress to impose penalties on
employers but not employees."' The Court, recognizing the extensive
amendments regarding the employment of unauthorized aliens put forth
by the 1986 IRCA,"' held that Arizona's law would interfere with "the
careful balance struck by Congress with respect to unauthorized
employment of aliens." 2 0

112. Section 5(C) states: "It is unlawful for a person who is unlawfully present in the
United States and who is an unauthorized alien to knowingly apply for work, solicit work
in a public place or perform work as an employee or independent contractor in this state."
Aiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2928 (LexisNexis 2012).
113. Section 6 states in pertinent part: "A peace officer, without a warrant, may arrest
a person if the officer has probable cause to believe ... [t]he person to be arrested has
committed any public offense that makes the person removable from the United States."
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3883 (LexisNexis 2012).
114. Section 2(B) states in pertinent part that "a reasonable attempt.. . to determine
the immigration status" must be made of any individual that has been stopped, detained,
or arrested on other grounds if "reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien and
is unlawfully present in the United States." ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051 (LexisNexis
2012).
115. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2495.
116. Id. at 2502-03.
117. Id. at 2502.
118. Id. at 2505.
119. See id. at 2503-05 (citing various sections of 8 U.S.C. as amended by IRCA).
120. Id. at 2505.
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The Court then turned to § 6, which authorized state police to arrest
anyone whom the officer has probable cause to believe has committed a
removable public offense, and held that it was preempted.'
The
Court held that the authority granted by this provision gave state
officers more power than federal law gives to fully trained immigration
officers, conflicted with the arrest provision of the INA, and ultimately
allowed state police officers to act without any participation from the
federal government, resulting in the state "achiev[ing] its own immigration policy."' 22
The sole provision upheld was § 2(B), the show-me-your-papers
provision requiring police to verify with the DHS the immigration status
of any individual who has been stopped or otherwise detained if the
officer has "reasonable suspicion" the person is "unlawfully present in
the United States."'
In reasoning that § 2(B) could be applied
without conflicting with the INA, the majority relied on the fact that
Congress had explicitly provided a system whereby officers could verify
an individual's immigration status with the federal government."
Crucial to the Court's determination were three built-in limitations on
the state law. First, there is a presumption upon presentation of a
lawful Arizona driver's license, or other similar identificaiton, that the
individual is a lawful resident."' Second, the state law prohibits
considerations of race, color, or national origin."
Finally, the law
must be implemented in a manner consistent with federal regulations so
as to protect the civil rights and immunities of citizens."' However,
the Court left open future challenges based on how the law is interpreted and applied."s
As a result, the Court's opinion suggests that the rationalizations put
forth by Arizona for S.B. 1070, namely that state and local police possess
"inherent authority" to regulate immigration incidental to the state's
traditional police powers and that states are allowed to "mirror" federal
sanctions for violations of federal immigration law, were insufficient

121. Id. at 2507.
122. Id. at 2506.
123. Id. at 2507 (quoting ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B)).
124. Id. at 2508-10 ("At this stage, without the benefit of a definitive interpretation
from the state courts, it would be inappropriate to assume § 2(B) will be construed in a way
that creates a conflict with federal law.").
125. Id. at 2507.
126. Id. at 2508.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 2509-10.
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justifications.'" However, the Court's opinion failed to address S.B.
1070 and self-deportation themed legislation as a whole, leaving open
the possibility that states will find new avenues to pursue the same
goals through similar legislation.
2. Justice Scalia'sDissent. While several justices wrote dissents,
Justice Scalia's has received the most attention, essentially coming to an
opposite conclusion on every issue but the upholding of § 2(B). His
dissent focuses in large part on the state as the sovereign entity whose
borders are being threatened, as opposed to the majority that weighs
S.B. 1070 against the context of federal sovereignty over foreign
0 For support, Scalia quoted to Fong Yue lIng's assertion that
affairs.o"
"it is an 'accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign
nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to selfpreservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions.'""a1 Justice Scalia admitted that he accepted two situations when
a state regulation is excluded by the Constitution: "when (1) it has been
prohibited by a valid federal law, or (2) it conflicts with federal
regulation."1 32
According to Justice Scalia, any restriction of a state's power to
exclude must be unequivocally expressed by Congress-field preemption
does not suffice.as After all, "[wle are not talking here about a federal
law prohibiting the [sitates from regulating bubble-gum advertising, or
even the construction of nuclear plants. We are talking about a federal
law going to the core of state sovereignty: the power to exclude.""
Therefore, because S.B. 1070 does not exclude anyone federal law would
admit, or admit anyone federal law would exclude, Justice Scalia would
uphold the law in its entirety, as "[ilt applies only to aliens who neither
possess a privilege to be present under federal law nor have been
removed pursuant to the Federal Government's inherent authority."'3 5

B.

State Legislation in the Wake of Arizona

The first noteworthy application of Arizona came in August 2012,
when the Eleventh Circuit decided two cases challenging laws in
129. See Lucas Guttentag, Immigration Preemption and the Limits of State Power.
Reflections on Arizona v. United States, 9 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 19 (2013).
130. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2511-15 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
131. Id. at 2514 (quoting Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 705).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 2515.

20141

PERPETUAL CONGRESSIONAL INACTION

811

Alabama and Georgia that mimicked Arizona's S.B. 1070 in several
aspects and, in Alabama's case, went even further by attempting to force
unlawfully present individuals to remove themselves from the state.
First, the Eleventh Circuit decided GeorgiaLatino Alliance for Human
Rights v. Governor of Georgia," wherein the court considered a
preliminary injunction against enforcement of Georgia's Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011 (H.B. 87).xa3 The court
upheld the preliminary injunction against § 7, which made it a state
crime to: (1) transport or move an illegal alien,'a (2) conceal or harbor
an illegal alien," or (3) induce an illegal alien to enter the state of
Georgia. 4 o In holding that the plaintiffs met their burden to show the
likelihood of a successful preemption challenge, Judge Wilson looked
primarily at the intent of Congress, noting that "[tihe INA provides a
comprehensive framework to penalize the transportation, concealment,
and inducement of unlawfully present aliens."' 4 ' Due to the allinclusive nature of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(aX1XAXii)-(iv), the court held
Georgia's law likely to be preempted by federal law as there is no room
for state action within the field.14 2
Next, Judge Wilson turned to the preliminary injunction against § 8,
Georgia's show-me-your-papers provision, which authorizes police officers
to investigate the immigration status of any individual who cannot
produce adequate proof of citizenship, provided that the officer has
probable cause to suspect the individual is in the country illegally.143
Relying on the Supreme Court's treatment of a similar provision in
Arizona, the court concluded that the plaintiffs could not establish a
likelihood of a successful preemption challenge, and therefore no
preliminary injunction was issued.'" In so holding, Judge Wilson
noted that the Georgia law authorizes, but does not require, police
officers to conduct an investigation, unlike its Arizona counterpart that

136. 691 F.3d 1250 (2012).
137. Ga. H.R. Bill 87, Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2011) (codified in scattered sections of the
O.C.G.A.).
138. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-200(b) (2011 & Supp. 2013).
139. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-201(b) (2011 & Supp. 2013).
140. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-202(b) (2011 & Supp. 2013).
141. Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights, 691 F.3d at 1263.
142. Id. at 1267 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)). Additionally, the court stated that
Georgia's law also created a conflict with federal law because it created a new crime
unparalleled by federal law by making it a crime for an individual to entice an illegal alien
to enter another state. Id. at 1266.
143. Id. at 1267; see also O.C.GA § 17-5-100(b) (2013).
144. Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights, 691 F.3d at 1267-68.
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mandates investigation.'4 Furthermore, the Georgia law contains the
same three built-in limitations as Arizona's law. 46
Immediately following GeorgiaLatino Alliance for Human Rights, the
Eleventh Circuit issued another opinion also authored by Judge Wilson
regarding a challenge to state immigration regulation in United States
v. Alabama."' The Alabama legislature passed H.B. 56" on June
2, 2011, based on its finding that "illegal immigration is causing
economic hardship and lawlessness in [Alabama] and that illegal
immigration is encouraged when public agencies within [Alabama]
provide public benefits without verifying immigration status."'49
Governor Bentley signed H.B. 56 into law that same month.5 o
According to Representative Hammon, a sponsor of the law, its purpose
was to "attack[] every aspect of an illegal alien's life" in order to force
According to the legislative
illegal aliens to "deport themselves."'
findings, H.B. 56 was designed to "discourage illegal immigration within
the state and maximize enforcement of federal immigration laws through
cooperation with federal authorities."'
Shortly thereafter, organizations such as the Immigration Reform Law Institute characterized the
law as the "most advanced omnibus state immigration enforcement
legislation" to date.'
Judge Wilson, again writing for the court, began the opinion by noting
that in order to grant a preliminary injunction, the moving party must
establish the following: "(1) substantial likelihood of success on the
merits; (2) irreparable injury will be suffered unless the injunction
issues; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs whatever
damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4)
if issued, the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest."5 4
However, the court noted that the focus of the issue is on whether the
United States is likely to succeed on its preemption claims.'

145. Id. at 1268.

146. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100(b); O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100(d)).
147. 691 F.3d 1269 (2012).
148. 2011 Ala. Acts 535.
149. ALA. CODE § 31-13-2 (LexisNexis 2011).
150. 2011 Ala. Acts 888.
151. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, No WAY TO LIvE: ALABAMA'S IMMIGRANT LAw 1 (2011),
availableat http-//www.hrw.org/sites/defaulttfiles/reports/usl211ForUpload_2.pdf.
152. Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1276 (citing ALA. CODE § 31-13-2).
153. Alabama Passes the Most Advanced State Immigration Law in U.S. History,
IMMIGR. REFORM L. INsT., http://www.irli.org/node/39 (last visited Feb. 14, 2014).
154. Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1281 (quoting McDonald's Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d
1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 1998)).
155. Id.
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Several sections of Alabama's law followed the precedent set by
Arizona, such as a show-me-your-papers provision,' the creation of
a new state crime for an unlawfully present alien who fails to carry the
necessary registration documents,"' and the criminalization "an
'unauthorized' alien's application for, solicitation of, or performance of
work, whether as an employee or independent contractor."5 8 To
address each of these sections, Judge Wilson quoted extensively from
Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, relying on the same
analysis.' 5 9 However, the Eleventh Circuit also had to consider several
sections of H.B. 56 that went considerably further than Arizona's S.B.
1070.
Judge Wilson analyzed each section individually, beginning with § 10,
which made an illegal alien's "willful failure to complete or carry
registration documents in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1304(e) [and] 1306(a)"
a state crime.' Acknowledging that a very similar provision was held
to be preempted in Arizona, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the decision
of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama
and held that federal law preempted § 10.161 Relying on the Supreme
Court's determination that the federal government has occupied the
entire field of alien registration, the court concluded that "even
complementary state regulation is impermissible."' 62 Even if the goal
of the state is shared by the federal government, the law will still be
preempted in order to prevent any dilution of federal control over the
desired field.163
Alabama enacted a section that mirrored § 7 of Georgia's H.B. 87 that,
among other things, made it a state crime to attempt, conspire, or
actually transport unlawfully present aliens."' In upholding the
injunction, Judge Wilson quoted Georgia Latino Alliance for Human
Rights, reemphasizing that "federal law 'provides a comprehensive
framework to penalize the transportation, concealment, and inducement
of unlawfully present aliens.'"'65
The court relied on Arizona to hold § 11(a), which cannot be
distinguished from § 5(C) of Arizona's S.B. 1070 making it a crime for an

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

ALA. CODE § 31-13-12(a) (LexisNexis 2011).
ALA. CODE § 31-13-10 (LexisNexis 2011).
Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1277 (citing ALA. CODE § 31-13-11(a)).
Id. at 1284-87.
Id. at 1282.
Id.
Id. (quoting Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2502).
Id.
Id. at 1285.
Id. (quoting Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights, 691 F.3d at 1263).
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unlawfully present individual to apply for work, expressly preempted by
federal law.'66 In Arizona, the Supreme Court determined that the
federal government enacted the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986 (IRCA) with the intention of establishing a "comprehensive
framework" to deal with individuals who employ illegal aliens.' 67
Furthermore, the fact that Congress chose not to impose consequences
on illegal aliens who accept employment, but only on those employers
who chose to hire said unauthorized aliens, was determinative in the
Court's analysis."s Consequently, Judge Wilson held that § 11(a) was
expressly preempted by federal law based on the decision by Congress
that "it would be inappropriate to impose criminal penalties on aliens
who seek or engage in unauthorized employment."'69
Similarly, the court held that § 16, which prohibited employers from
deducting wages paid to unlawfully present aliens on their state taxes,
essentially had the same effect as a direct fine.7 o Therefore, Alabama
was unsuccessful in its defense of § 16 due to 8 U.S.C. § 1324a, part of
the IRCA, which expressly preempts "any [s]tate or local law imposing
civil or criminal sanctions ... upon those who employ, or recruit or refer
for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens."' Along the same line
of thought, Judge Wilson also held that § 17 amounted to an unauthorized sanction and was therefore preempted. 7 2 Section 17 made it a
"discriminatory practice" for an employer to employ unlawfully present
aliens while concurrently firing or failing to hire someone who is
authorized to work in the country. 73 In holding that § 17 was preempted, Judge Wilson noted that the provision was "clearly intended to
punish"; the addition of prerequisite conditions to the punishment did
not alter the fact that it was a sanction. 74
Next, the court considered § 27, which prohibited Alabama courts from
recognizing any contract between an unlawfully present alien and a
party who was, constructively or explicitly, aware that the alien's
presence was unlawful. This provision was considered to be a large part
of the reason why H.B. 56 was heralded as the harshest immigration law
in the country.7 7
Recognizing that § 27 destroyed any opportunity

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 1282-83.
Id. at 1283 (quoting Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2504).
Id.
Id. (quoting Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2505).
Id. at 1288, 1290.
Id. at 1289-90 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(hX2)).
Id. at 1290-91.
ALA. CODE § 31-13-17(a) (LexisNexis 2011).
Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1290-91.
Id. at 1292 (citing ALA. CODE § 31-13-26(a) (LexisNexis 2011)).
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that unlawfully present aliens have to contract even for basic necessities,
Judge Wilson stated that they would not have the ability to "maintain
even a minimal existence."17 6 The court held that § 27 was preempted
on several grounds."' The foremost ground was that § 27 amounted
to an attempt by Alabama to enact a "policy of expulsion" and was
therefore "preempted by the inherent power of the federal government"
over immigration.7 8 Additionally, the court held that the expulsion
power Alabama was attempting to exercise conflicted with the comprehensive framework established by Congress for removal of an alien.179
In light of the fact that any state that imposes "distinct, unusual and
extraordinary burdens and obligations upon aliens" could be trespassing
into a field of federal regulation, the court found that this "blanket
prohibition" most certainly qualified as an extraordinary burden."
Therefore, Judge Wilson held § 27 to be field preempted "by the inherent
power of the federal government to regulate immigration."'
In the end, the court held that three sections of H.B. 56 were
constitutional. Relying on Arizona and quoting extensively from Georgia
Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Judge Wilson concluded that the
challenge to § 12(a), the show-me-your-papers provision, was not
preempted by federal law, stating that it is not an issue when states
request information that is clearly contemplated by federal law.' 82
However, the court specifically left open future challenges based on the
law's application and effects." Consistent with allowing § 12(a) to go
into effect, the court also upheld § 18, which required officers to inquire
as to whether an individual in violation of Alabama Code § 32-6-1 or
§ 32-6-9, provisions regarding driving without a valid license, is lawfully
present within the United States."

176. Id. at 1293.
177. Id. at 1294-97.
178. Id. at 1294. The "[plower to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively
a federal power." Id. (quoting De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976)).
179. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (codifying federal law concerning the deportation of
aliens).
180. Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1293 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 65-66).
181. Id. at 1294-95. Alabama argued that § 27 was protected because the field of
contract law is "typically within the province of the states and therefore entitled to the
presumption against preemption." Id. at 1295. Following the Supreme Court's instruction
that preemption analysis must also consider the practical effect of the state law, not just
the means by which the state attempts to achieve its purpose, the court rejected this
argument. Id. at 1296. While contracts are an area of typical state concern, Alabama
could not enforce § 27 without intruding into an area of federal law. Id.
182. Id. at 1283-85.
183. Id. at 1285.
184. Id. at 1292.
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The court also held that § 30 was neither preempted by federal law
nor in conflict with the federal immigration scheme."'s Section 30, as
amended, made it a felony "for an unlawfully present alien to enter into
certain'public records transaction[s],"' such as applying for or renewing
a vehicle license plate, a driver's license, a business license, a commercial license, or a professional license. 8 6 After undergoing an extensive
preemption analysis, Judge Wilson concluded that while § 30 is not
exactly in harmony with the existing federal scheme, it is not facially at
odds with federal law, nor is it preempted.'

C. Alabama Settlement
The plaintiffs and the state of Alabama have come to a settlement
agreement regarding the suits challenging H.B. 56."a The settlement,
which must still be approved by the court, would essentially leave
unenforced nearly every provision of H.B. 56, specifically blocking the
following sections: 10, 11(a), 11(f), 11 (g), 13, 16, 17, 27, and 28.189 The
civil rights groups battling against H.B. 56 touted the settlement as a
"significant victory," and now, according to Kristi Graunke, an attorney
for the Southern Poverty Law Center, "it is time for our state lawmakers
to repeal the remnants of HB 56 and for our congressional delegation to
support meaningful immigration reform that will fix our broken
system." 9 0

Importantly, Alabama agreed to narrow the interpretations for several
key provisions that were not blocked, including § 12, Alabama's showme-your-papers

provision.''

While not specifically blocked, the

interpretation put forth by Alabama essentially makes the law inoperable and unenforceable. Indeed, the settlement states that Alabama will
interpret § 12 "to neither require nor authorize state or local law
enforcement officers to stop, detain, arrest or prolong the detention of
any person for the purpose of ascertaining that person's immigration
status or because of a belief that the person lacks lawful immigration

185. Id. at 1301.
186. Id. at 1297 (quoting ALA. CODE § 31-13-29 (LexisNexis 2011)).
187. Id. at 1300-01.
188. Mike Cason, HB56 Two Years Later: Settlement Takes Bite out of Alabama's
ImmigrationLaw, AL.CoM (Nov. 3, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://blog.al.com/wire/2013/11/hb56_
two-yearslaterconstitut.html.
189. Id.
190. Catherine E. Shoichet & Gustavo Valdes, Settlement Would Block Controversial
Partsof Alabama Immigration Law, CNN (Oct. 29, 2013), 7:30 PM, http://www.cnn.com/
2013/10/29/us/alabama-immigration-law-settlement/.
191.

Cason, supra note 188.
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status."'9 2 Many provisions remain untouched by the settlement, such
as the section prohibiting illegal immigrants from attending a state
university or college, the provision requiring proof of citizenship before
entering into a transaction with the state (such as a driver's license),
and the section mandating that employers use an "E-verify" system
when determining the eligibility of employees.1 9 3 The settlement will
not only force Alabama to block many provisions of H.B. 56, but it will
also cost the state $350,000 in legal fees and expenses for the groups
that sued to block the law.194
V.

OTHER DECISIONS IMPACTING IMMIGRATION: UNITED STATES V.
WINDSOR

The Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Windsor'"
is expected to produce an increase in immigration. Prior to Windsor, § 3
of DOMA, passed in 1996, mandated that same-sex couples not be
recognized with regard to any transaction with the federal government.' 96
This provision prevented same-sex couples from being
recognized for immigration purposes, often resulting in the splitting
apart of families and loved ones.
In Windsor, the Supreme Court struck down § 3 of DOMA because it
discriminated against same-sex couples in spite of valid state-law
marriages.19' Therefore, in light of this decision, the federal government may now recognize same-sex couples for all transactions, including
immigration. Nevertheless, after the decision, uncertainty existed as to
exactly which state law would be looked to when determining marriage
status for the purposes of immigration. However, those anxiously
awaiting the result were not made to wait long. Shortly after the
opinion, the DHS recognized that "as a general matter, [the United
States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) looks to the law
of the place where the marriage took place when determining whether
it is valid for immigration law purposes." 9 s Furthermore, the United
States Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has demonstrated that it will

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id.
Id.
Shoichet & Valdes, supra note 190.
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
Id.
Id. at 2695.
Implementation of the Supreme CourtRuling on the Defense of MarriageAct, U.S.

DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/topic/implementation-supreme-court-rulingdefense-marriage-act (last visited Feb. 14, 2014).
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look to the validity of the marriage where it is celebrated for immigration purposes.199
As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Windsor, the longstanding and frequently cited case of Adams v. Howerton.oo is now
superseded. In Adams, the Ninth Circuit held that the same-sex
marriage of a United States citizen to an Australian citizen did not
qualify as a marriage for immigration purposes. 20 ' In holding the
marriage invalid for immigration purposes, the court relied on three
grounds: (1) the existence of INA provisions at the time that barred the
admission of so-called sexual deviants, (2) deference to the administration interpretation of the statute prohibiting the admission of same-sex
couples, and (3) the "ordinary, contemporary, common meaning" of
marriage.
Reflecting "plenary power" deference to Congressional
choices, the Supreme Court in Adams also held that an interpretation
of the term "spouse" in the INA to exclude parties to a same-sex
marriage would not be unconstitutional.20 3
An interesting question that falls outside the scope of this Comment
is whether a future administration might theoretically reject the
approach of the Obama administration, which interpreted the term
"spouse" in the INA included parties to a same-sex marriage, and
instead revert to the previous interpretation of the term "spouse," which
excluded parties to a same-sex marriage. Perhaps even more interesting
is the question whether, in a post-DONA and post-Windsor world, courts
would still follow Adams in deferring to such an administrative
interpretation and in holding such an interpretation to be constitutional
in light of the special deference to Congress in the immigration area
under the plenary-power doctrine.2 4'
VI.

WHAT POWER Do THE STATES STILL HAvE?

As the above analysis from the Eleventh Circuit cases demonstrates,
the options open for states to regulate immigration appear to be steadily
shrinking in the wake of Arizona. While citizens of states with high
populations of unlawfully present aliens remain frustrated, the federal

199. In re Zeleniak, 26 I&N Dec. 158 (BIA 2013).
200. 673 F.2d 1036 (1982).
201. Id. at 1038, 1043.
202. Id. at 1040-41 (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)).
203. Id. at 1042-43.
204. See Scott C. Titshaw, The Meaning of Marriage: ImmigrationRules and Their
Implicationsfor Same-Sex Spouses in a World Without DOMA, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN
& L. 537, 588-600 (2010) (discussing Adams and its aftermath and arguing that Adams
should no longer be controlling precedent).

2014]

PERPETUAL CONGRESSIONAL INACTION

819

government has demonstrated a relentless approach to maintaining its
exclusive power over immigration. Furthermore, any new assistance to
actively combat the presence of illegally present aliens from the federal
government is mere speculation at this point. Quite the contrary, the
DHS announced that the administration would be shifting its limited
resources to focus on those who have committed serious crimes, as
opposed to every person who is in the country illegally.205 In 2012, a
bipartisan comprehensive immigration reform bill had advocates
optimistic after being signed by the President and advanced by a Senate
vote. 206 However, progress has all but halted, as House Speaker John
Boehner has refused to put the bill up for a vote.207 With reform
inevitable but nowhere in sight, states will undoubtedly continue to take
matters into their own hands whenever possible, looking to Arizona and
how it has been interpreted to promulgate permissible regulation of
immigration.

A. PermissibleRegulation
1. Papers Provision. Based on the previously discussed cases, it
seems clear that states may pass and enforce show-me-your-papers
provisions, at least for now. These provisions should be crafted to
mitigate discrimination with built-in limitations, such as: (1) presuming
the individual is lawfully in the country when a valid driver's license is
present, (2) prohibiting the officers from considering race, color, or
national origin, and (3) requiring that the law be implemented in a
manner consistent with federal law.20 s While papers provisions are
presumably helping to combat the problem some states are having with
illegally present aliens, it merely makes the state a facilitator-these
provisions do not permit states to actively take part in regulating
immigration beyond contacting ICE and potentially making them aware
of an illegal alien.
Despite being permissible regulation, the backlash caused by the
papers provisions so far should give states pause when they are
contemplating anything similar. For example, there are many disturbing trends that developed in Alabama following the enactment of its

205. George P. Mann, New Developments in ImmigrationEnforcement and Compliance,
2013 Edition, ASPATORE (Sept. 2013), availableat 2013 WL 4381843, *1.
206. Carrie Dann & Andrew Rafferty, Despite Gridlock, ImmigrationAdvocates Keep
Up Fightfor Reform, NBC NEws (Oct. 8,2013), 6:41 PM, http://www.nbenews.com/politics/
politics-newadespite-gridlock-immigration-advocates-keep-fight-reform-v2o874868.
207. Id.
208. See generallyArizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2507-08.
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papers provision. For one, the citizens acted as if they themselves were
deputized to enforce H.B. 56, resulting in legal residents often demanding proof of immigration status from anyone they suspected could be in
the country illegally.209 However, the racial profiling was not limited
to citizens. A report based on over 6000 calls to the Hispanic Interest
Coalition of Alabama hotline suggests that "[sicores of Latinos called to
report that they suspected they had been stopped by police, after the HB
56 provisions became enforceable, mainly because they look Latino-so
that officers could question them about their immigration status."210
Furthermore, profiling such as this has led to many Latinos, both
illegal and legal residents, fleeing from Alabama. This flight resulted in
devastating losses to the poultry industry and the agricultural fields in
2012, as employers struggled to fill empty jobs once held by Latinos. 21
Even Alabama's foreign relations were hurt when a Mercedes-Benz
executive was arrested following his inability to produce adequate
documentation that he was in the country legally.2 1 2 While some
workers returned in 2013, many farmers are still struggling to fill the
vacancies caused by the initial fear of how the papers provisions would
be enforced. 1 3
Though show-me-your-papers provisions are undoubtedly a permissible
state regulation of immigration, the evidence so far suggests states gain
little from enacting them, given their limited impact on illegally present
residents and potential pushback from negative consequences.
Additionally, with application of the various show-me-your-papers
provisions being inconsistent at best, another challenge seems imminent.
The papers provisions grant too much discretion to every police officer
of the state, who have received little to no training on its application,
leaving a wide lane for discrimination to take place. Therefore, any

209. KAREN TUMLIN & RICHARD IRwIN, NAT'L IMMIGR. L. CTR., RACIAL PROFILING
AFTER HB 56: STORIES FROM THE ALABAMA HOTLINE 8 (2012), availableat www.nilc.org/
document.html?id=800.
210. Id. at 2.
211. Margaret Newkirk & Gigi Douban, Africans Relocate toAlabama to FillJobsAfter
ImmigrationLaw, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 24,2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-0924/africans-relocate-to-alabama-to-fill-jobs-after-immigration-law.html.
212. Amanda Peterson Beadle, German Mercedez-Benz Executive Arrested Under
Alabama's Immigration Law (Updated), THINK PROGREss (Nov. 21, 2011, 1:30 PM),
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2011/11/21/373334/german-mercedes-benz-executivearrested-under-alabamas-immigration-law/.
213. Kate Brumback, 2 Years After ImmigrationLaws, Ga., Ala., Stable, HUFFINGTON
PosT (July 6, 2013), 1:19 PM, http*//www.huffmgtonpost.com/2013/07/06/georgia-immi
gration-law-n_3554714.html.
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states having not already implemented a show-me-your-papers law may
be better off pursuing other more effective, less dangerous solutions.
2.
State Regulation of Employers Employing Immigrants. Despite the recent employment-related immigration regulations, which created new state crimes for the solicitation, application, or
performance of work by an illegal alien, being struck down by the
Supreme Court,214 regulating immigration through employment-related
provisions remains a viable option. The Court held in Arizona that such
laws imposing penalties on employees were invalid and preempted,
noting that "[tihe correct instruction to draw from the text, structure,
and history of IRCA is that Congress decided it would be inappropriate
to impose criminal penalties on aliens who seek or engage in unauthorized employment."2 15 Due to Congress's stated "method of enforcement," namely targeting employers of unlawfully present aliens, any
state law targeting unlawfully present employees engaged in unauthorized work is conflict-preempted by federal law.216
However, state laws regulating immigration through employment have
been successful when they target employers. The trend to focus on the
employment of undocumented immigrants began with the passing of the
IRCA in 1986, which put the responsibility for enforcement on the
employer."' Specifically, the IRCA has three provisions addressing
the unlawful employment of aliens, making it illegal to: (1) hire, recruit
or refer for a fee an alien with the knowledge that the alien is unauthorized; (2) continue to employ an alien knowing that the alien either is or
has become unauthorized; and (3) fail to comply with the document
verification requirements during the hiring process. 218 As these three
provisions demonstrate, and as the Court found determinative in
Arizona,2 19 the targeted party is the employer, not the employee.
However, the IRCA also explicitly preempts any state law that imposes
criminal or civil sanctions on employers employing unlawfully present
immigrants.220

214. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2505.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A) ("It is unlawful for a person or other entity to hire, or to
recruit or refer for a fee, for employment in the United States an alien knowing the alien
is an unauthorized alien ....).
218. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a) (2012).
219. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2504-05.
220. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(hX2) ("The provisions of this section preempt any State or local
law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws)
upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens.");
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While the preemption provision would seemingly prevent states from
enacting regulation that targets employers who knowingly employ
undocumented immigrants,221 the Supreme Court held in Chamber of

Commerce of the United States v. Whiting222 that the savings clause
creates an exception to the bar on civil sanctions. 2 23 At issue in
Whiting was a challenge against the Legal Arizona Workers Act 2 ' (the
Act) by several plaintiffs claiming that the Act was preempted by federal
law.225 Chief Justice Roberts delivered the Court's opinion, noting as
important that the law took a "route least likely to cause tension with
federal law" due to using the federal government's definition of
"unauthorized alien."2 26 Accordingly, the Court went on to acknowledge that states should still maintain broad authority to regulate
matters of employment through their police powers so that they may
protect both their workers and citizens. 227
In sum, the Court held that the Act was not expressly preempted
because it was permissible under the plain text of the savings
clause.22 In coming to this conclusion, the Court utilized a textual,
plain-meaning approach, looking at the plain language of the statute and
noting that Arizona defined the term "license" as it is commonly
understood within the federal government. 229 Thus, licensing laws are
exempted from the prohibition against state sanctions according to the
plain language of the savings clause.so
Consequently, the savings clause allows states to punish noncompliance with these laws by suspending or revoking a business's
licenses."1 Importantly, states may sanction a wide variety of business licenses, as the savings clause provides no limitation.12 By
limiting the available sanctions to suspension or revocation of a business
license, state immigration-related laws should fall under the savings
clause of the IRCA and be capable of withstanding a preemption

see Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1968 (discussing Arizona's law regarding work authorization for
immigrants).
221. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (preempting states from imposing civil or criminal penalties
for violations of the provision).
222. 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011).
223. Id. at 1977 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(hX2)).
224. See generally ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-211 to -214 (LexisNexis 2013).
225. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1977.
226. Id. at 1987.
227. Id. at 1981, 1987.
228. Id. at 1977-80.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 1984-85.
232. See id. at 1980.
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challenge. For example, the plain meaning of the Act in Whiting
demonstrated that it is a licensing law because the only available
sanction for violation is the suspension or revocation of the employer's
business license.m
Impermissible Regulation
While it is markedly less clear what avenues states may take to
regulate immigration without infringing on federal power, the Court has
made fairly clear what is not permissible.
B.

1. "Mirror Image" Legislation. Arizona and its progeny have
eliminated the justification that state laws that mirror federal law by
promulgating independent state punishments for violations are
permissible so long as they mimic their federal counterparts exactly.
This theory built upon language from Plyler v. Doe,' wherein the
Court recognized that De Canas v. Bica2 15 acknowledged that states
have "some authority to act" in response to illegally present immigrants,
so long as those acts "mirror[} federal objectives" and promote a
legitimate state goal.2 36 Based on this precedent, the theory then
developed that states may enact their own state penalties for federal
immigration violations.
In striking down the provisions that relied on this notion and their
newly created state crimes, the Court rejected the mirror-image rule as
a sufficient justification for parallel state punishment for violations of
federal immigration law. Importantly, the Court made clear that even
state penalties that run parallel to the federal scheme enacted by
Congress may still be preempted ifthey conflict with federal enforcement
policies. Thus, Arizona established that even parallel state regulation
or penalties that mirror federal law are not shielded from preemption.237
2. Rejection of Inherent State Authority Over Immigration. The claim by states to inherent authority over immigration stems
from the Tenth Amendment2 38 police power, which grants those powers

233. Id. at 1987; see also Aluz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212(FX1Xd), (2).
234. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
235. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
236. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 225 ("As we recognized in [De Canas] ... the States do have
some authority to act with respect to illegal aliens, at least where such action mirrors
federal objectives and furthers a legitimate state goal.").
237. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2502-03.
238. U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
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that are not specifically enumerated in the Constitution to the
Based on this notion, states assert that they have the
states."
authority to conduct arrests for federal immigration violations in the
same manner as they conduct arrests for other federal crimes, because
it is an exercise of the "basic power of one sovereign to assist another
sovereign" to enforce its laws."o This thought derives from a line of
Supreme Court cases wherein the Court upheld the lawfulness of state
arrests for federal crimes." However, none of these cases involved a
violation of immigration law.
VII.

NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES FROM SELF-DEPORTATION STATE
LEGISLATION

While early reports suggested success, it did not take very long for the
inherent flaws in self-deportation laws to manifest. The most glaring
concern lay with the enforcement of the papers provisions and potential
infringements upon constitutional rights. However, in Alabama, largely
regarded as the test subject for self-deportation laws, several potentially
damaging incidents with foreign executives occurred and H.B. 56
Furthermore, the
temporarily crippled the agricultural industry. 2
initial reports suggesting success of H.B. 56 were found to be false;
despite initially fleeing the state, the law's ultimate goal, illegally
present individuals returned to the state after several months once it
was apparent that the law was not resulting in statewide manhunts.
Ultimately, these laws not only cause potential infringements of
constitutional rights, but they also result in negative side effects for
states seeking to enact them.
Although Arizona generally marks a victory for those supporting
immigrants' rights, there remain significant concerns over the Court's
holding that § 2(B) is not preempted and subsequently allowing the
provision to be enforced.243 The Court found influential that § 2(B)
contained a provision prohibiting racial profiling and further noted that
"it would be inappropriate to assume §2(B) will be construed in a way

239. Id.
240. Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of
Local Police to Make ImmigrationArrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 200 (2005).
241. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301
(1958); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
242. See supra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
243. See, e.g., Roberto Cintli Rodriguez, Racial Profilingin Arizona: SB 1070 2(b) and
Not to Be, TRUTHOUT (June 29,2012, 1:11AM), httpJ/www.truth-out.orgnewsitem/10071arizonas-sb-1070-2b-and-not-to-be.
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that creates a conflict with federal law."" Accordingly, several states
have mirrored Arizona's law almost exactly, and these laws are
presumed enforceable so long as the statute contains self-limiting
language, such as that prohibiting racial profiling."'
Laws such as § 2(B) have been labeled show-me-your-papers laws
because of their requirement that any individual whom the officer has
"reasonable suspicion" to believe is an undocumented immigrant must
produce proof that he is lawfully present or a citizen upon demand from
the officer.2"
Legal citizens and illegally present aliens alike are
nervous about its implementation, and rightfully so-its application in
some states has been marked with a lack of uniformity and confusion,
leading to unwarranted detentions and arrests." Furthermore, while
the safeguards built into such statutes theoretically provide some
protection, the threat of discrimination is still present.
All show-me-your-papers laws are inherently flawed because the
"reasonable suspicion" language will lead to detentions, stops, and
arrests based on prohibited factors such as race, color, and ethnicity.
Currently, due to the inability of officers to enforce show-me-your-papers
laws without relying on racial profiling, several groups have already
brought challenges on equal protection and due process grounds. " As
indicated by the interpretation agreed to by Alabama in the settlement
over H.B. 56, states may be recognizing that show-me-your-papers laws
contain too many inherent flaws to be a worthwhile method of immigration regulation.
Self-deportation laws can also harm a state's relationship with foreign
businesses, as Alabama learned only six weeks after passing H.B. 56.
Following a standard traffic stop, Tuscaloosa police were required to
arrest a man when he could not produce a driver's license, but only a
German identification card."' Unfortunately, the individual was an
executive with Mercedes-Benz, which has a production plant in
Alabama.5 o Not long afterward, a Japanese Honda worker was also

244. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2510.
245. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B); ALA. CODE § 31-13-12(aXc); O.C.G.A.
§ 17-5-100(bXd).
246. See, e.g., ARi. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B).
247. See TUMLIN & IRWIN, supra note 209, at 1-2.
248. See Michael Kiefer et al., Police Can Start Enforcing Ariz. Immigration Law,
Judge Rules, THE REPUBLIC (Sept. 18, 2012, 9:54 PM), http://www.azcentral.com/news/po
litics/articles/ 2 0120918arizona-immigration-law-police-can-start-enforcing-judge-rules.htmil.
249. Benly Sarlin, How America'sHarshestImmigrationLaw Failed,MSNBC (Feb. 11,
2014, 5:23 PM), http//www.manbc.com/msnbdundocumented-workers-immigration-ala
bama.
250. Id.; see also supranote 212 and accompanying text.
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arrested during a traffic stop for being unable to provide proper
identification.2 51 Fearing that such incidents would make foreign
investors pull out of the state, the business community raised an outcry
against H.B. 56.252
H.B. 56 in Alabama also revealed the effects of self-deportation on
agriculture. The initial flight of agricultural workers in 2011 caused by
fear of the law right after it was passed led to empty fields and rotten
crops."' While those who initially fled have, for the most part, since
returned, their brief absence came during crucial times for many
farmers, who were forced to leave crops unpicked and rotting." The
wasted crops led to thousands of dollars of losses for many farmers.
Furthermore, because of the labor shortage from the previous year,
farmers decided to plant less in 2012.2' Even with the immediate
effects having subsided, the repercussions are still being felt throughout
Alabama.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The boundaries of states' authority to pass immigration-related laws
will undoubtedly continue to be pushed. The public outcry for some kind
of meaningful change to immigration regulation taken against illegally
present aliens has only grown louder in the past several decades and
will undoubtedly only continue to increase until significant change
occurs. Both the demand by the public as well as the perpetual inaction
of Congress were the conditions that drove states to pass laws such as
Arizona's S.B. 1070 and Alabama's H.B. 56-with these conditions still
present, the pressure on the states to regulate immigration will continue
to rise.
Even though laws designed to cause self-deportation are now losing
favor and seem to be ineffective, the concerns over illegally present
aliens that drove their passage remain legitimate. It is these concerns
that pressured lawmakers to pass self-deportation laws in the first place,
not only in Alabama, but in Georgia, South Carolina, and Arizona as

251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Ed Pilkington, Alabama Immigration: Crops Rot as Workers Vanish to Avoid
Crackdown, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 14, 2011, 2:58 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world
/ 2 011/oct/14/alabama-immigration-law-workers.
254. Id.
255. Julie Strupp, Alabama Illegal Immigrant Crackdown Destroys Farm Business,
PoucY MIC (May 14, 2012), http://www.policymic.com/articles/8272/alabama-illegal-immi
grant-crackdown-destroys-farm-business.
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well.256 With this pressure once again mounting, immigration reform
is expected to be one of the most prominent topics in 2014. While House
Republicans currently are unwilling to consider the immigration reform
that has already passed the Senate, they face powerful lobbying efforts
from both big business and big labor. Critics remain concerned that the
current proposition will flood the job market, resulting in fewer jobs for
American workers, while proponents believe the reform will boost the
economy and make America a more desirable destination. Unsurprisingly, politicians are also counting on the future votes new immigrants will
bring and are lobbying accordingly.257
With immigration reform expected to be the most heavily debated
issue of 2014, federal and state legislators would do well to keep in mind
Justice Kennedy's parting remarks in Arizona:
Immigration policy shapes the destiny of the Nation.... The history
of the United States is in part made of the stories, talents, and lasting
contributions of those who crossed oceans and deserts to come here.
The National Government has significant power to regulate immigration. With power comes responsibility, and the sound exercise of
national power over immigration depends on the Nation's meeting its
responsibility to base its laws on a political will informed by searching,
thoughtful, rational civic discourse. [States] may have understandable
frustrations with the problems caused by illegal immigration while that
process continues, but [they] may not pursue policies that undermine
federal law.28
BENJAmIN D. GALLOWAY

256. See Sarlin, supra note 249.
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